What is acrasia, a term often translated as ‘the weakness of will?’ Acrasia is the crucial theme of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics Bk. 7 Ch. 3. This chapter details a situation in which the weak-willed man, or acratic, understands something to be bad for him, but acts against that knowledge, doing what he understands to be bad.

In recent years, several scholars, including Prof. David Charles, have developed a promising, though unpopular, interpretation of this passage. Charles’ interpretation suggests that the weakness of the acratic man is a failure of practical knowledge rather than a failure of intellectual knowledge or desire itself. This practical knowledge, as Charles explains, is uniquely vulnerable to the effects of desire, memory, and anticipation. Please join us for an incisive treatment of one of the most controversial topics in contemporary Aristotle scholarship.

Bio

David Charles is Howard H. Newman Philosophy Professor at Yale University. He has previously been Colin Prestige Fellow at Oriel College, Oxford, and Research Professor in Philosophy in the Faculty of Philosophy, Oxford. He focuses his research on ancient philosophy, especially on Aristotle’s philosophy, and on philosophy of mind. Most recently, Charles has published a book titled The Undivided Self: Aristotle and the ‘Mind-Body Problem,’ which argues that Aristotle regarded many psychological phenomena as inextricably psycho-physical.